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Trends in Judicial Selection in the States
Meryl J. Chertoff*
I. INTRODUCTION

Many legal academics and the majority of the judiciary itself view judicial
selection by election as inimical to values of judicial independence.' The electedjudge paradigm has been criticized repeatedly in the popular media, through bar
association publications, and in law reviews. Defenders argue the system is as
good as or better than any other, but this is a decidedly minority view among
anyone with a law degree.2 Yet Americans in the states that use this mechanism
to select judges are reluctant to give it up. When put to polling, the elected-judge
model, with its promise of accountability to the voters, is quite popular.' And it is
the polls, not the legal experts that hold the attention of state legislators, who

* The author is Director of the Justice and Society Program at the Aspen Institute, and Adjunct Professor
of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. From 2006 to 2009 she directed the Sandra Day O'Connor
Project on the State of the Judiciary at Georgetown Law. The author wishes to acknowledge Bert Brandenburg
of Justice at Stake and Roy Schotland, Professor Emeritus at Georgetown Law for their valuable insights during
the preparation of this article. Professor Charles Geyh offered many helpful observations, and is an inspiration
to all of us thinking about these issues. Thanks also to Megan Gerking, Georgetown Law J.D. candidate, for
excellent research assistance.
1. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and ImpartialJustice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623,631 (2009).
2. John D. Feerick observed in a symposium issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal that proponents of
elections are reluctant to give up their vote. See Why We Seek Reform, 34 FORD. URB. L.J. 3, 11 (2007) (noting
that reforming a judicial selection system is especially difficult because the general public is easily persuaded
that elections providing them with the right to vote are preferable to appointive systems because they are
thought to be "more open and transparent and more fully reflective of the democratic principle"); see also
Stephen Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians:The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than
Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 328 (2010) (empirical analysis demonstrating that the
determination of whether an appointed judiciary is better than an elected judiciary is complicated and it may
potentially be concluded that elected judges are better in some states but not in others); James Bopp, Jr. & Anita
Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts, Extraordinary Case: The Sui Generis Recusal Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60
SYR. L. REV. 294, 308 (2010) (promoting judicial elections because they "ensure that judges are held
accountable to the people, rather than to political elites and insiders, and provide a mechanism to keep judges
within their legitimate bounds").
3. In a 2007 survey of 1,514 adults, 64% favored direct election and 31% favored a system in which
governors nominate judges from a list of names prepared by an independent, bipartisan committee. ANNENBERG
PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT
FOR THE COURTS (2007), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Judiciary/documents/finalversion

JUDICIALFINDINGSoctl707.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). In a 2008 poll, 82% of a sample of
five hundred Alabama voters approved of the partisan election of Alabama Supreme Court justices only two
years after a particularly bitter contested election for a supreme court seat in that state. WOMANTREND,
ALABAMA: 501 LIKELY VOTERS (Sept. 25-28, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Other polls
found similar margins among voters in Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See WOMANTREND,
MIssISsiPPI: 500 LIKELY VOTERS (Sept. 23-28, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (finding 76%
approval); WOMANTREND, OHIO: 502 LIKELY VOTERS (Sept. 22-24, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (finding 83% approval); WOMANTREND, PENNSYLVANIA: 500 REGISTERED VOTERS (Sept. 23-27,
2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (finding 67% approval); WOMANTREND, TEXAS: 700 LIKELY
VOTERS (Oct. 6-11, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (finding 80% approval).
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must weigh the risk and benefit, as well as the political consequences, of reforms
in their states.
While the outlook has been grim for many years, there are a few recent
developments which offer a glimmer of hope to reformers seeking to reduce the
reliance of many states on electing judges. Two recent Supreme Court cases,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co4. and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission5, have focused increased public attention on the role of money both
in state court judicial races and in elections generally. Advocacy groups that have
long worked for changes in selection practices have grown increasingly
sophisticated, and interest groups that have funneled funding to unseat incumbent
judges have found increasing resistance from a more educated and informed
group of interested voters.
Historically, state court judicial elections were relatively sedate affairs.
While judicial elections were subject to the criticism that they valued
accountability over independence, the stakes of the argument were insufficient to
draw widespread popular concern. Since 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,' campaign finance reform, and the
increasingly bitter economic contest of the "tort wars" in some states have led to
an upward spiral in spending on state judicial races, particularly at the state
supreme court level.' The decision of the Supreme Court last term in Caperton,"o
and the January 21, 2010 decision in Citizens United ," created a new focus on
spending in all political races, but notably so in judicial races.
Now, concern about electing judges is no longer the province solely of
academics, advocates, and interest groups. The new public awareness invites two
arguments. First, that judicial elections are economically inefficient. Second, that
the long-argued view among proponents of elections-that they are the only way
to assure accountability by judges to popular opinion--can be addressed by other
mechanisms, notably, a transparent judicial nomination commission system,

4. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
5. 130 S. Ct. 876(2010).
6. Groups, such as Justice at Stake, Brennan Center for Justice, Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System at the University of Denver, American Judicature Society, Sandra Day O'Connor
Project on the Judiciary, and the National Institute of Money in State Politics, have increasingly been in the
public forefront and the news.
7. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1995).
8. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
9. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE
1, 11 (2010) (comprehensive report on the dramatic increase in spending on state judicial election campaigns),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/d091dc9l1bd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). "Campaign fundraising more than doubled, from $83.3 million in 1990-1999 to $206.9 million in
2000-2009." Id. Twenty of twenty-two states that elect Supreme Court judges had the costliest contests in the
2000-2009 period. Id.
10. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
11. 130 S. Ct. 876(2010).
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more vigorous judicial recusal, and increased use and dissemination of judicial
performance evaluations.
Recent developments in both Nevada and West Virginia suggest that
legislatures and voters are ready to re-evaluate the way judges are selected, and
that effective change in those states may serve as a model for a more widespread
recalculation in other states. 2 West Virginia's efforts related to public financing
and recusal standards in the wake of the Caperton decision and, in Nevada,
voters were presented with the opportunity to move away from elected judges in
a ballot proposition in the November 2010 elections." While these are
incremental changes, they suggest that state legislatures may be willing to
explore the possibility of moving away from the elected judge paradigm. This
effort may be helped by, of all things, the economic downturn. Like a family
recalculating its budget in light of straitened circumstances, the players in judicial
elections-labor
unions, corporations,
and wealthy
individuals-are
reprioritizing their spending. As these corporations evaluate the responsible
expenditure of funds, and as unions assess the best use of member dues, the
economic waste of high-stakes campaigns becomes increasingly significant.
II. HISTORY AND RATIONALE

The United States is almost the only nation in the world that selects judges at
any level by popular election. 4 While the Framers of the U.S. Constitution
established judicial independence through the structural provision of Article III's
tenure "during good behaviour,"" the states, after initially emulating the federal
system, commenced an experiment in diversification as one aspect of
federalism. 6
In the early years of the American Republic, most judges were selected by a
state's chief executive or legislature. 7 Jacksonian reformers, convinced that the
process created a spoils system, introduced judicial elections as an antidote to

12. Nevada lawmakers added a merit selection measure to the ballot in 2010 and voters will decide
whether to scrap their judicial elections in November 2010. SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 9, at 4. West Virginia
established a judicial nominating commission in March 2010 to screen and submit "qualified nominees to the
governor when midterm judicial vacancies occur" and the state legislature approved a pilot public-financing
program for Supreme Court elections in 2012. Id. at 69-71. However, in Minnesota, a proposed bill that would
have adopted retention elections for appointed judges and would have establish a judicial performance
commission responsible for evaluating the performance of judges was derailed in the state legislature. S.F. 70,
2009-2010 LEG., 86TH SESS. (MINN. 2010).
13. SAMPLE ETAL, supra note 9, at 81.
14. Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between
Impartial Courts and JudicialElection Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1232-33 (2008) (noting the
exceptions are a "few small cantons in Switzerland and retention elections [for] high-court judges in Japan").
15. U.S. CONsT. art. n, § 1.
16. Shepherd, supra note 1, at 630.
17. Id.
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that perceived corrupt system.'8 Judicial elections are enshrined in the
constitutions of many states, particularly in the South and Midwest.
Currently, thirty-two states use contested elections (either partisan or
nonpartisan) to pick judges for at least some level of their courts, and twenty-one
states elect all judges." Twenty-five additional states utilize the so-called "merit
selection" system, in which judges are initially selected by a state's governor to
serve a term in office, and then face the voters in an up-or-down uncontested
retention election. 2 ' A handful of states have adopted some version of the federal
system, in which judges are selected by a state's governor with senate
confirmation. In two states, Virginia and South Carolina, the legislature selects
the judiciary.22 Of course, even in states that utilize elections, it is common for a
judge who intends to retire or resign to do so during his or her term in office,
particularly if he or she is of the same party as the governor. Governors almost
universally make midterm appointments. Thus, midterm resignations allow a
newly-appointed judge of a governor's own political party to run as an
incumbent.23
The pastiche of selection mechanisms in the various states, and even between
different courts in the same state, presents a confusing picture to voters, and
encourages indifference to judicial elections in the absence of some galvanizing
issue.
III. INDEPENDENCE V. ACCOUNTABILITY

Judicial selection poses the systemic challenge of balancing independence
against the accountability of members of a branch of government to the public
that it serves. As Charles Geyh, a leading authority on the history of judicial
elections and the history of state judicial constitutions points out, judicial
independence is not viewed by scholars as an intrinsic good in itself, but is a
means to an end: "It is thought that if judges are independent-if they are
insulated from political and other controls that could undermine their impartial

18. Id. at 631.
19. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, amend. 328, §6.13 (establishing partisan elections for all state court
judges); ARK. CONST. of 1868, amend. 80, §17-18 (1874) (establishing nonpartisan elections for al state court
judges); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI, §7 (1983) (establishing nonpartisan elections for state court judges); ILL.
CONST. of 1818, art. VI, §12 (1970) (establishing partisan election for all state court judges); LA. CONST. of
1812, art. V, §22 (1974) (establishing partisan elections for all state court judges); WIs. CONST. of 1848, art. VII
(establishing nonpartisan elections for all state court judges).
20. Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Formal Methods of Judicial Selection in Each
State, http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/judicial-map.html (last visited June 28, 2010) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). See appendices A and B to this article for a chart of each State's selection method.
21. Appendices A & B.
22. Appendices A & B.
23. See supra note 19 (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Wisconsin dictate that the governor will
appoint judges during interim vacancies).
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judgment-they will be better able to uphold the rule of law, preserve the
separation of powers, and promote due process of law." 4
Accountability, as Professor (and former Alabama Supreme Court Justice)
Harold See notes, serves a distinct yet overlapping set of interests. 25 To improve
the judicial selection process, See urges the following consideration:
[C]onsider what level of popular control is appropriate in a particular
state. The answer to this question will depend on, among other things,
the level of the public's confidence that a judge will foster the rule of law
rather than implement the judge's own public policy predilections. If
judges act, or are inclined to act, as a "super-legislature" the electorate
may choose to control judges the way it does a legislature. 26
Professor See's argument has considerable popular support, although he
often finds himself in the minority in the academy. A closer look though,
suggests that the accountability argument vastly oversimplifies the institutional
mechanism that exists within the judicial system to constrain the behavior of
judges.
State courts have adopted various mechanisms to restrain outlier judges.
Almost every judge is accountable to someone. For example, trial judges' rulings
are subject to at least two levels of appellate review. Intermediate appellate
judges act in panels of three or more, so the judgment of two colleagues may rein
in the excess of another. Next are the canons of ethics, judicial conduct
committees, and grievance procedures. Recusal motions (and self-recusal) exist
as a mechanism to exclude a judge from hearing cases in which he or she may
have a financial interest or bias. Only the highest court of the state exercises
unreviewable discretion.
If this logic is correct, the only level at which examination of the
accountability argument truly has weight is at the state supreme court level. Yet it
is at that level where the fewest states elect judges-most elections are for trial
*27
judges.
This counterintuitive evidence suggests that the argument about
accountability is really a mask for some other value. If the argument falls apart
on scrutiny, perhaps a closer look at the selection system itself is warranted.
What it suggests is that citizen/voters look for accountability at the level where
they are exposed to the actions of the judge. If it is at the trial court level-and

24. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial
Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1259 (2008).
25. See generally Harold See, Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 141 (1998).
26. Id. at 144.
27. Of the thirty-two states that utilize elections, ten of the states do not elect judges at the supreme court
level. See Amer. Judicature Soc'y, Methods of Judicial Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
selection/methods/selection.ofjudges.cfm?state= (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
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that is where most Americans are exposed to the system, through the hundreds of
thousands of traffic cases, divorces, and contract disputes that make their way
through the system in any given year-then that is where anger will be
expressed. If it is indirect exposure-through media reports on the actions of a
state's highest court, then that is where it will be expressed. In either case,
populist sentiment expresses the desire that judges "act like us", whereas the
institutional role of the court is often to do exactly the opposite-to act according
to legal rules, rather than popular sentiment.
In legal academic circles, the pitfalls associated with judicial elections are
oft-enumerated: the threat to actual independence (if judges feel indebted to
litigants or attorneys who have donated to their campaign); the threat to
perceived independence (that the public will perceive an elected judge as no
more than "a politician in a black robe"); the phenomenon of roll-off (in which
voters do not reach the end of the ballot containing the names of poorly
recognized judicial candidates); and straight ticket voting (where voters do not
vote on the merits, but simply based on party affiliation).
Certainly, the most pernicious attribute of the elected-judge system is the
threat to judicial legitimacy, that the public perceives judges to be influenced by
campaign contributions, or worse still, that the judge actually is influenced by
these contributions. It is this aspect of judicial selection that has most captivated
the public imagination very recently, and it is this factor which may stimulate
public debate about the elected-judge paradigm.
IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, WHITE, AND THE JUDICIAL ELECTION
ARMS RACE

Developments in the early part of the decade contributed substantially to a
"race to the bottom" in judicial elections. Passage of the McCain-Feingold Law,
which enacted federal campaign finance reform, was accompanied by increasing
use-both at the federal and state level, including in state judicial campaigns-of
so-called "527 organizations" (527s),29 contributed to this race to the bottom.30

28. See id. at 279-81 (discussing that a large portion of funding for state judicial elections comes from
attorneys and parties who have cases before the court); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why JudicialElections Stink, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 53 (2003) (discussing phenomenon of voter roll-off); CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN
HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 20-26 (2009) (discussing findings that during 1990-2004
approximately 22% of all voters who participate in other elections fail to vote in state supreme court elections);
Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L. J. 1041, 1046 (2007) (suggesting that often people
straight ticket vote or do not vote at all in judicial elections).
29. The term "527 organizations" refers to groups that engage in issue advertising without endorsing a
particular candidate. This stems from 26 U.S.C. § 527 of the United States tax code, a provision that exempts
groups from paying taxes. These organizations are tax-exempt entities that engage in issues advertising,
focusing on policy issues in campaigns, including judicial campaigns. See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem .
. .And the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 949, 951 (2005) (generally explaining 527 organizations
and their requirements).
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Issues advertising, which is supported by independent expenditures, is subject to
disclosure requirements in thirty-nine states, but unlike direct contributions, is
not subject to limitation." These 527s have become big players in certain hotly
contested judicial races. For example, the $2.7 million in independent
expenditures targeting the three Supreme Court races in the state of Washington
in 2006 "was 36 percent greater than the $1.7 million raised directly by the six
candidates."32
The rise of the 527s coincided with a second key development: the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2002 decision in the leading case of Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White." In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that "[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibiting
candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal
and political issues violate[d] the First Amendment." Following White, interest
groups from all sides of the ideological spectrum made increasing use of judges'
responses (or non-responses) to questionnaires, as well as their rulings on past
cases (if incumbents), to target or tout candidates with a particular philosophy or
predisposition that the groups viewed as sympathetic.
Taken together, the rise of the 527s and the post-White judicial election
climate facilitated scenarios not too far removed from the one portrayed by the
novelist John Grisham in his 2008 novel, The Appeal.16 In the novel, the CEO of
a corporate defendant, confronted by a crippling and precedential jury verdict in
a toxic tort case, seeks to improve his company's chances of winning the appeal
in the state's supreme court through subterfuge.' He identifies and promotes an
obscure trial judge as a candidate for the state supreme court in order to replace a
more plaintiff-friendly incumbent." The real-life facts of Caperton are
disturbingly similar to the novel-newly elected Justice Benjamin provided the
deciding vote in the appeal of a $50 million dollar judgment against Massey Coal
30. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 9 at 9-22 (describing dramatic increase in state judicial campaigns
by non-candidate groups).
31. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882-883 (2010) (holding that
restrictions on independent expenditures during campaigns violate the First Amendment, while disclosure
requirements are consistent with the First Amendment).
32. ANNE BAUER, NATL. INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES, 2006:
INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN FIVE STATES ALTER POLITICAL LANDSCAPES 27 (2007), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/5809.pdf

(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The

law on contributions may be changing in the wake of Citizens United. See Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that independent contributions as well as expenditures
cannot be limited under the First Amendment).
33.

34.
35.
Retention
the public

536 U.S. 765 (2002).

Id. at 788.
Rachel Paine Caufield, Reconciling the Judicial Ideal and the Democratic Impulse in Judicial
Elections, 74 Mo. L. REv. 573, 595-99 (2009) (discussing the rise of inappropriate efforts to educate
with issue-based questionnaires).

36.

JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).

37.
38.

Id.
Id.
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after its CEO Don Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million dollars to Justice
Benjamin's West Virginia Supreme Court campaign through a 527 called "And
For The Sake of the Kids." 39
The Caperton facts point to the last component of what some commentators
have called an "arms race" in judicial fundraising-judicial races as a surrogate
for legislative tort reform.40
Escalating expenditures through the early part of the decade were not a mere
byproduct of White and the rise of 527s. They were largely motivated by a fierce
clash between the trial attorneys' bar and corporate interests. 4 ' Throughout the
past twenty years, the corporate community has struggled for meaningful tort
reform, especially damage caps, through the state legislative process.42 While a
number of states have adopted damage caps, forum-shopping allows personal
injury litigation to flourish in states that have not. 43 The corporate community
remains convinced that state courts, at both the trial and appellate level, are
dominated by former plaintiffs' attorneys and that this has biased the litigation
process. Through local affiliates of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers, corporate interests have taken on trial
attorneys in an effort to elect sympathetic judges through the creation of 527s and
political action committees that channel corporate donations to targeted races.
Against this backdrop, the Court's decision in Citizens United is no seismic
shift. Rather, it is part of a continuum, in which the actors-corporate, labor, and
trial attorney-each with a strong interest in electing "their" judges, use all
available speech and funding tools.

39. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257-58 (2009). In its campaign finance
disclosure form "And for the Sake of the Kids" lists as its stated purpose to "promote[] the independence of
West Virginia courts and educate[] West Virginia residents about the importance of an equal and balanced civil
justice system and related matters." CampaignMoney.com, And for the Sake of the Kids "527" Political
Organization Filing Information, http://www.campaignmoney.com/political/527/and-forthe-sake of-the_
kids.asp (last visited June 28, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
40. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address at the Georgetown University Law Center and
Aspen Institute Symposium on State Judicial Selection: Choosing (and Recusing) Our State Judges Wisely (Jan.
26, 2010) available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventdetail.cfm?eventid=1006 (last visited Oct.
19, 2010).
41. Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the Progressives,
39 AKRON L. REV. 943,943 (2006).
42. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES (2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/Report.pdf (showing states that have passed damage
caps); Janutis, supra note 41 at 3 (examining tort reform initiatives at the state level).
43. Id. (for example, Delaware has not passed any tort reform legislation since 1986).
44. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 3. THE U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform
publishes a guide to "lawsuit climate" in the fifty states. The 2010 report lists biased and partial juries and
judges as the top issue creating unfair and unreasonable litigation climates-at 37%. Institute for Legal Reform,
Lawsuit Climate 2010, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/lawsuit-climate.html (last visited June 28, 2010)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). A less polite publication, called "Judicial Hellholes," calls for voters
in elected-judge states to vote out judges who are too generous to tort suit plaintiffs. AMERICAN TORT REFORM
Ass'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 28 (2009), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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V. CAPERTON AND CITIZENS UNITED

While the decision in Caperton captivated court watchers and reinvigorated
efforts to refine judicial recusal guidelines in the states, it was the Court's
decision in Citizens United that has become a cause c6l6bre.
In Citizens United, the Court, in a decision by Justice Kennedy, held that
corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections
cannot be limited under the First Amendment. 45 The 5-4 decision resulted from a
dispute over whether the non-profit corporation Citizens United could air via
video-on-demand a critical film about Hillary Clinton, and whether the group
could advertise the film in broadcast ads featuring Clinton's image, in apparent
violation of the McCain-Feingold Act." The Court struck down a provision of the
McCain-Feingold Act that prohibited all corporations, including for-profit, notfor-profit, and unions, from broadcasting "electioneering communications." 47
McCain-Feingold defined an "electioneering communication" as a broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication that mentioned a candidate within sixty days of
a general election or thirty days of a primary.48 The decision overruled Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce49 and partially overruled McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.0 The Court upheld requirements for disclaimer and
disclosure by sponsors of advertisements."
The case will, without doubt, affect laws governing corporate political
activity in nearly half the states.
While the ruling does not directly affect state laws, there are 24 states
that currently prohibit or restrict corporate and/or union spending on
candidate election. It is very likely that these states will act to either
repeal or rewrite these laws, or face legal challenges under the new
standard set by Citizens United. Furthermore, it is likely that states will
elect not to enforce the restrictive laws from this point forward . . . It is

important to note that the Citizens United decision does not strike down
bans on corporate contributions to candidates, which currently exist in 23
states.52

45. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
46. Id. at 887.
47. Id. at 913-14.
48. 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(l)(aa)-(bb) (2005).
49. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
50. 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887, 913-14.
51. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913-14.
52. National Conference of State Legislators, Life After Citizens United (May 27, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid= 19607 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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The decision solely addressed the ban on direct corporate and union
spending."
What effect will this have on spending in state court elections? As of the date
of this article, no one knows. But if spending at the beginning of the 2010
Congressional campaign cycle provides a benchmark, the evidence is far from
conclusive that this marks the profound change that critics, among them
President Obama, allege. At least at the level of U.S. Congressional races, the
concern that money in campaigns would dramatically increase because of large
corporate donors has yet to be borne out.5 4 Conversely, Republicans predicted in
February that there would not be a direct effect on parties or candidates after the
Citizens United decision. Likewise, spending this year by 527s offers no clear
trends." "So far, both collections and expenditures by Democratic or liberalleaning groups have outpaced those by Republican or conservative groups,
although a historically large Democratic advantage appears to have narrowed
somewhat, according to data from the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics."
Democrats and liberal-leaning groups have both raised and spent more money
than Republicans this past year, but their historic advantage has narrowed.
In at least two states there have been court challenges to state campaign
finance rules based on the Citizens United decision. The Western Tradition
Partnership recently filed suit challenging Montana's state limits on corporate
expenditures as an unconstitutional ban on political speech. Colorado Governor
Bill Ritter filed interrogatories with the Colorado Supreme Court asking the court
to determine whether its state election laws were constitutional under Citizens
United; the Court responded that they were not.
While most commentators focus on the increased potential for corporate
spending, the disclosure language in the majority opinion in Citizens United has
attracted less attention.w0 Yet it has a powerful potential. If states follow the
federal lead, advocacy group ads will soon be accompanied by fuller disclosure
of who has paid for an ad-a disincentive to out-of-state interest groups who hide
behind ambiguous 527 names.

53. See id. (providing a summary of state laws affected and other developments in the states since
Citizens United).
54. R. Jeffrey Smith, Democrats Pull in More Cash for Campaigns than GOP, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
2010, at A3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
58. Press Release, Western Tradition Partnership, WTP Files Suit to Protect Free Speech in Montana
(Mar. 8, 2010), availableat http://www.westerntradition.org/?p=626 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
59. In re Interrogatories Propounded by Governor Ritter v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 227 P.3d 892, 894
(Colo. 2010).
60. The Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act, introduced in and
passed by the House of Representatives, but failed in the Senate, would do this at the federal level. S. 3628,
111 th Cong. (2010); H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
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VI. IS THERE A PROMISING FUTURE FOR MERIT SELECTION?

Both Citizens United and Caperton have energized efforts by reformers in
the states. The effort has been further fueled by the emergence of a prominent
figure on the American judicial and civic scene as an advocate for adoption of
merit selection. While a number of advocacy groups have engaged with the issue
for years-notably the American Bar Association, American Judicature Society,
National Center for State Courts, The Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System (IAALS), and Justice at Stake, the recent emergence of
retired United Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as an advocate for
merit selection in the states has given a shot of adrenaline to those who question
whether contested elections are the best way to select judges.
Through the Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary at
Georgetown University Law Center, the O'Connor Judicial Selection Initiative at
the IAALS at the University of Denver, personal appearances before the National
Governors' Association 2007 annual meeting (July 23, 2007), and the ABA's
National Summit on Fair and Independent Courts (May 8, 2009),62 as well as
numerous speeches and publications from 2006 to date, Justice O'Connor has
passionately pled for adoption of a version of merit selection along the lines first
utilized in Missouri63 to increase transparency and reduce attorney domination of
selection panels in, among other places, her home state of Arizona.64

61. See Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at
WK 9 (advocating for the merit selection system for choosing judges). O'Connor is not alone in her view
among present and past members of the high Court. Justice Ruth Ginsburg recently publicly stated she disfavors
judicial elections in the states. See Matthew Mosk, Study Shows Money Flooding Into Campaignsfor State
Judgeships, ABC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2010, http://abcnews.go.comlBlotter/study-shows-money-flooding-campaignsstate-judgeships/story?id=10120048 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that Justice Ruth
Ginsburg announced that the one reform she would like to see is money in state judicial elections).
62. See generally ABA, JUSTICE ISTHE BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT: REPORT OF THE 2009 SUMMIT
ON THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FAIR AND IMPARTIAL STATE COURTS (2009), available at http://www.
lwv.org/Content/ContentGroups/Projects/Judiciallndependence/Miscellaneous/sunmmitreport.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (examining the role of fair and impartial state courts). O'Connor is the Honorary
Chair of the ABA Presidential Commission on Fair and Impartial State Courts. Id. at I1.
63. See generally Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan,
Earl F. Nelson Lecture at the University of Missouri School of Law Symposium (Mulling over the Missouri
Plan: A Review of State Judicial Selection and Retention Systems) (Feb. 27, 2009), in 74 MO. L. REV. 479
(2009).
64. Critics of O'Connor charge that she opposes a federal-style executive appointment of judges. Her
public comments on the federal selection system belie that view. See Situation Room: Interview with Sandra
Day O'Connor (CNN television broadcast Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/l001/28/sitroom.02.htmi (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing benefits of the
appointed federal judiciary).
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The clearest articulation of the components of O'Connor's preferred model is
in the position statement of the IAALS initiative. The IAALS advocates these
"best practices" in selection systems:

>

Politically balanced nominating commissions with a majority of
non-lawyer members making recommendations in a transparent
process;

> Appointments by the governor, who must select judges from lists
provided by the nominating commissions;

>

Comprehensive judicial performance evaluations that are based
on criteria such as command of the law, impartiality, and
temperament;

> Retention elections, so that voters armed with the performance
evaluations can decide whether to keep the judges on the bench;
> Terms of office that are initially only two to three years in
length, so that there is sufficient data about judicial performance
before the retention elections;
> Judicial training.
The proposals mirror the system that was adopted by Arizona in 1974, and
has since been refined through Proposition 109 in 1992." Arizona's Proposition
109 changed the membership of judicial selection commissions-with the
number of attorneys increased from three to five, and the number of laypeople
increased from five to ten.6 ' The selection commissions take applications from
61
individuals for judicial positions. They then hold public proceedings to screen
and interview potential selectees." The commissions are charged with selecting
judges that reflect the diversity of the Arizona population.o The system makes
use of judicial performance evaluations in advance of a retention election,
providing voters with substantial information in advance of their vote." The
Arizona system is quite popular in the state, and in the words of the Chief Judge
of Arizona Ruth McGregor:

65. Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/judicial
selection.html (last visited June 28, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
66. Ruth McGregor, Arizona's Merit Selection System: Improving Public Participationand Increasing
Transparency,59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 383, 383 (2009).
67. Id. at 389.
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Proposition 109 not only assured greater participation by public members
on the commissions, but also addressed the need for greater
transparency; it required the commissions to take public testimony and to
conduct more of their business in public sessions, including the
commission vote on selecting candidates to send to the governor.7
Arizona's retention election system and judicial selection commissions
appear to have factored in the criticisms leveled by Professor See and others, and
have created a system which is both accountable and has largely eliminated
costly judicial elections in Arizona.
For the first time in many years, prospects seem somewhat favorable to the
changes Justice O'Connor and others advocate for states besides Arizona. An
example is Nevada, where a ballot initiative in November will ask voters to move
from a contested election model to a merit selection system.7 ' Advocates have
assembled a coalition of labor, business, and grassroots organizations in what is
hoped to be the first statewide rejection of an existing contested election system
in recent years.74
In Minnesota, a bill would present to the voters a constitutional change that
would allow the governor to appoint judges to an eight-year term, with a
retention election provision-a version of "merit selection."" This would replace
a contested-election system in the state. The Minnesota bill also includes a
vigorous judicial performance evaluation regimen, increasing the information
available to voters in the retention election.
In Maryland, Attorney General Doug Gansler and State Senator Jamin
Raskin partnered to introduce S.B. 833, a bill that would conform the selection of
state circuit court judges, the state's trial court judges, to the method of selection
used for other judges in the state, the "merit selection" system.
VII. THE ISSUE IS JoINED-Is DtTENTE POSSIBLE IN THE TORT WARS?

If Citizens United and Capertondid anything to draw popular attention to the
way judges are picked, it was to highlight the role of "big money" in those races.
This requires, as Professor Pamela Karlan points out in her lucid review of the
Caperton ruling in the Harvard Law Review, an examination of the structural
problem in judicial elections-"the way in which money undermines judicial

72. Id. at 389-390.
73. O'Connor, supra note 61.
74. Meryl Chertoff, SCOTUS Decision Could Trickle Change Down to States, DAILY CALLER, Jan. 21,
2010, available at http://dailycaller.com/2010/01/21/scotus-decision-could-trickle-change-down-to-states/ (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
75. S.F. 70, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. S.B. 833, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).

59

2010 / Trends in Judicial Selection in the States
impartiality and public confidence in the judicial process."" Parties with a
pecuniary interest in the judicial philosophies and predispositions of judgesparticularly supreme court judges-will continue to engage in an economic
calculus in the states where they reside or do business for as long as judges are
elected. And while there is no one-to-one correlation of contributions with
outcomes, Karlan argues that regardless of the outcome in each case, the
structural problem still exists."
Public financing is one suggested approach for eliminating the structural
problem. West Virginia, in the wake of Caperton, has not only tightened its
judicial recusal standards, but in March of this year it became only the fourth
state in the nation to adopt a pilot program for public financing of state judicial
elections-joining North Carolina, Wisconsin, and New Mexico.8' However,
public financing, with its First Amendment issues and many loopholes, is fraught
with hazards of its own.82
Another answer is to take the money out of the system by shifting the
paradigm. Ending judicial elections would free up large sums of money that
could be put to a more collectively valuable use." This approach makes sense
from an economic standpoint given the current financial stresses.
For example, Arizona's judicial selection system disbursed only about
$300,000 in 2008 supporting selection commissions.' By contrast, state supreme
court candidates nationwide raised $200.4 million from 1999-2008, compared
with an estimated $85.4 million from 1989-1998.
In its 2006 report, The New Politics of Judicial Elections, Justice at Stake, an
advocacy group, took aim at the amount of spending in state court races and the

79. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARv. L.
REv. 80, 101 (2009).
80. Id. at 101-102.
81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A (2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
11.31 (2009) (establishing limits on campaign disbursements for judicial election candidates).
82. See Brandenburg & Schotland, supra note 14.
83. In a system in which goods or money are inefficiently allocated, a more economically efficient
outcome could be achieved. A change where one person is made better off, without making another person
worse off, is considered a Pareto improvement. Ultimately, in Pareto efficient situations it is impossible to put
someone in a better position without putting another person in a worse position. See KENNETH J. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 97-100 (2d ed. 1963); Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic
Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development, A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust,
Intellectual Property,and Tort Law Rules and Policy, 39 HARV. J. LEGIs. 63, 71 (2002) (discussing theory that
allocative efficiency will be maximized when government policies gives beneficiaries equivalent of more
dollars than it takes away from its victims).
84. Telephone Interview with Theresa Spahn, Director of the O'Connor Judicial Selection Initiative
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, University of Denver (Apr. 8, 2010).
85. National Institute on Money in State Politics, http://www.followthemoney.org (last visited July 5,
2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Arizona expects to spend approximately $425,000 for fiscal
year 2010 on judicial selection at all three levels of its state courts. General Appropriation Act for Laws 2010,
7th Special Sess., Ch. 1. Colorado, a state with more judicial districts than Arizona, estimates that it will spend
$900,000 in 2010. H.B. 10-1376 (Co. 2010). Both states' costs go toward maintaining nomination commissions,
judicial performance evaluations, and salaries.
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tone of the advertising campaigns in some of the most high profile races." With a
focus on high-stakes races in a few state supreme court races, some in states
known for generous personal injury verdicts, the report outlines an escalating
trend of spending.
With the boom-times over, the question is whether both sides will now
reconsider their strategies. A few developments suggest this is possible. First, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently endorsed the Arizona merit selection
system as a best practices model." While this does not suggest that the Chamber
has gone out of the business of putting money into judicial elections, it does
suggest that a paradigm shift might not be totally unwelcome news to the
Chamber. It would allow member resources to be focused on influencing the
outcome of federal and state legislative campaigns and other advocacy priorities
rather than state judicial candidate campaigns. Second, the transparency
requirements affirmed in Citizens United will make the use of 527s less
appealing." It appears that anonymous 527 funded advertising is on its way
towards becoming a thing of the past.
In a heightened disclosure environment, corporate, union, and individual
funders will need to ask themselves if they want their names directly associated

86. See generally JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2006), available
at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006 D2A2449B77CDA.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). Among its findings: "In 2006 television advertisements ran in 10 of 11
states with contested Supreme Court elections, compared to four of 18 states in 2000;" "In 2006 average
spending on TV airtime per state surpassed $1.6 million, up from $1.5 million two years ago;" and "[in 2006
television ads appeared during primary elections in seven of the 10 states in which advertising occurred. Nearly
one third of all spots throughout the campaign cycle were in primary campaigns, totaling more than $4.6
million." Id. at vi. The report also found that: "Of the 10 states that had entirely privately financed contested
Supreme Court campaigns in 2006, five set fundraising records. Candidates in Alabama combined to raise $13.4
million, smashing the previous state record by more than a million dollars;" "Donors from the business
community gave $15.3 million to high court candidates-more than twice the $7.4 million given by attorneys;"
"Third-party interest groups pumped at least $8.5 million more into independent expenditure campaigns to
support or oppose their candidates. About $2.7 million of that was spent in Washington state alone;" " In 2006
the candidate raising more money won 68 percent of the time, down from 85 percent in 2004;" and that"[t]rial
lawyers and corporate interests in a southern Illinois race combined to give more than $3.3 million to two
candidates for a seat on the state court of appeals, quadrupling the state record. Madison County witnessed a
$500,000 trial court campaign, and a Missouri trial court judge was defeated after an out-of-state group poured
$175,000 into a campaign to defeat him." Id. at vii.
87. See generally id.
88. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, PROMOTING "MERIT" IN MERIT SELECTION: A BEST
PRACTICES GUIDE TO COMMISSION-BASE JUDICIAL SELECTION 2 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research/meritselectionbooklet.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
89. See id.
90.

Again, while not binding on state regulators, a March 26 D.C. Court of Appeals decision,

Speechnow.org v. Federal Election Commission, Nos. 08-5223, 09-5342, 2010 WL 1133857 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(citing Citizens United) held that restricting spending by 527 organizations was inconsistent with the First
Amendment, but upheld financial disclosure requirements, suggesting that state courts presented with a similar
challenge would do the same.
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with issues advertisements or with direct advertisements in support of a particular
candidate.'
This article argues that both sides would benefit from a long and careful look
as to whether taking money out of the game would not benefit all in the long
term. The 2008 Presidential election, state off-year elections, and special
elections illustrate that it is becoming more difficult to gauge voter mood and to
manipulate voter sentiment. The interests that have sought to manipulate voter
bias to win judicial races now face competition from social networking sites,
blogs, and "Netizen" advocates. Reform groups are particularly adept at tapping
those resources.
The institutional legitimacy of the courts should concern both sides. While
tempting to bash a particular candidate in any given race, the effects are
cumulative, and if we foster disrespect for judges we undermine the rule of law
in all our courtrooms. No frequent litigant benefits from a system without norms.
Taking judicial selection out of the contested election model has immediate,
favorable economic consequences in cost savings, which can be redirected by the
stakeholders to other, more pressing priorities.92
Finally, while there are many critiques of merit selection, few have gone
unaddressed by Arizona as it has made successive legislative adjustments to the
judicial nominating structure it first adopted in the 1970's. While no one system
is perfect for every state, Arizona's model provides a template worth examination
by states considering reform.93 Conversely, nothing prevents an elected judge
from being an activist. The perils of judicial activism exist in every system of
selecting judges: in pure selection states, in merit selection states, and in electedjudge states. But by taking the money out of the system, we reassure the people,
and the judges themselves, that decisions are based on adherence to the law and
not on a debt to donors.

91. They may get a nudge from at least some state legislative bodies. See H.B. 616 (Md. 2010)
(introducing a bill that would require that corporate executives or union leaders who seek to make political
campaign expenditures first obtain a majority vote of shareholders or union members); A.B. 9948 (N.Y. 2010)
(requiring shareholder approval for both corporate independent expenditures (currently unlimited in New
York)) and corporate contributions to candidates (currently limited to $5,000)); H.B. 2016 61st Leg., 2010 Sess.
(Wash. 2010) (requires listing of the top five contributors so that if the sponsor of a communication is a political
committee established, maintained, or controlled directly or indirectly through the formation of one or more
political committees, by an individual, corporation, union, association, or other entity, the full name of that
entity must be listed).
92. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
93. Proponents of elections, such as my colleague Dmitry Bam in this volume, point out that elected
judges give harsher sentences as they approach their re-election. Dmitry Bam, Understanding Capterton:
Judicial Disqualification under the Due Process Clause, 42 McGEORGE L. REv. 65 (2010). But if those
sentences are not justified by sentencing guidelines, or are out of line with the general practice in the
jurisdiction, such sentences are no less activist than any other departure from regular judicial process.
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Appendix A
Some or All State Judges Elected Directly By Citizens or By State Legislature
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'Judges run in the first general election after their appointment in order to complete the remainder of their first term.
2

Judges are chosen in a partisan primary election, then candidates' names are included on the general election ballot without their party
affiliation. Sitting judges face nonpartisan elections for retention.
3Sitting judges are subject to retention elections.
Sources: American Judicature Society, Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review, Kansas Commission on Judicial
Performance, Missouri Judicial Branch, The Missouri Bar, Tennessee Supreme Court.

Prepared by The Institute for theAdvancement of theAmerican Legal System at the University of Denver

April 7,2010

63

2010 / Trends in Judicial Selection in the States
Appendix B
States That Select Judges in a Commission-Based Appointment and Retention Election
System (No Judicial Performance Evaluation)

Sources: American Judicature Society, Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review,
Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance, Missouri Judicial Branch, The Missouri Bar,
Tennessee Supreme Court.
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